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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this action, we consider the District Court's denial of 
a motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings 
pending arbitration. We exercise jurisdiction over this 
matter under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or the 
"Act"), 9 U.S.C. S et seq., which permits appeal as a matter 
of right from orders denying motions to compel arbitration. 
Since this appeal presents a legal question concerning the 
applicability and scope of an arbitration agreement, our 
standard of review is plenary. See Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, 
7 F.3d 1110, 1113 (3d Cir. 1993). Because we find the 
arbitration clause at issue in this case enforceable, we will 
reverse the order of the District Court, denying the motion 
to compel arbitration. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
This action was filed in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on February 14, 
1997, by Charles Harris, Christine Harris, Willie Davis, and 
Nora Wilson (collectively, the "Harrises"). 2 The Harrises 
claim to be victims of a fraudulent home improvement 
scheme. This scheme allegedly was orchestrated and 
perpetrated by Green Tree Financial Corporation ("Green 
Tree"); Green Tree's subsidiary, Green Tree Consumer 
Discount Company ("GT Discount"); Lawrence M. Coss, the 
Chief Executive Officer of Green Tree; and several building 
contractors. These contractors include Fredmont Builders, 
P. Angelo & Sons, Inc., Frank R. Lucci, Jr., and Tyrone 
DeNittis.3 
 
The home improvement scheme of which the Harrises 
claim to be victims worked as follows. Using direct 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Harrises sought class certification and thus are putative class 
members. 
 
3. Together with Green Tree and GT Discount, defendants Coss, Lucci, 
and DeNittis appeal the District Court's decision. 
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marketing techniques, Green Tree allegedly recruited 
dozens of home improvement contractors, including those 
identified above. These contractors allegedly were enlisted 
for the purpose of obtaining high-interest rate secondary 
mortgage contracts from homeowners, which were to be 
sold and assigned to Green Tree or GT Discount. Green 
Tree allegedly instructed the contractors to obtain such 
mortgages by, inter alia: marketing themselves as Federal 
Housing Authority ("FHA") and U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development ("HUD") approved home 
improvement dealers; targeting relatively unsophisticated, 
low- to middle-income, senior citizens; promising that the 
work would be performed at an affordable cost and that no 
payment would be required until the customer was satisfied 
completely with the workmanship; using standardized loan 
contracts that were generated by Green Tree or GT 
Discount; inserting a clause in these contracts that allowed 
the mortgagee to charge exorbitant amounts for collateral 
protection insurance ("CPI"); and employing high-pressure 
sales tactics to solicit customers, such as in-home sales 
and telemarketing. Cmplt. PP 1, 3, 9. 
 
The contractors allegedly used all of these strategies in 
soliciting the Harrises. Cmplt. PP 29, 37-39, 50, 62. After 
the Harrises agreed to the home improvement work 
described by the relevant contractor in his sales 
presentation, the contractor allegedly presented to them 
several standardized loan contracts, including a secondary 
mortgage contract ("the standard form contract"). Cmplt. 
PP 4, 15, 40-45, 51-52, 66. The Harrises claim that they 
were told that they had to sign these standardized 
contracts before construction could begin or be completed 
on their homes; thus, the Harrises signed the forms. Cmplt. 
PP 46, 51-52, 66. Almost immediately after the loan papers 
were signed, the contractors allegedly sold and assigned the 
loans and mortgages to Green Tree or GT Discount. Cmplt. 
PP 4, 41, 53, 66. 
 
Thereafter, the contractors performed home improvement 
work on the Harrises' homes. The Harrises contend, 
however, that the contractors either did not perform the 
work, specifically promised in the contracts, or performed 
the promised work, but in an unsatisfactory manner. 
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Cmplt. PP 4, 46, 54-56, 74-75. On numerous occasions, the 
Harrises allegedly complained to Green Tree about the 
nature and quality of work performed by these contractors, 
but to no avail. Cmplt. PP 48, 56 57, 76. 
 
Thus, the Harrises allege that they received little of value 
from the contractors, yet were saddled with a sizeable debt 
secured by mortgages on their homes. Cmplt. #9E9E # 4, 77. 
Rather than risk the loss of their homes, the Harrises have 
paid Green Tree according to the allegedly fraudulent and 
misleading terms outlined in the mortgage contracts. 
Cmplt. PP 4, 47, 77. 
 
As a result of this sequence of events, the Harrises' 
brought suit against Green Tree, GT Discount, Coss, and 
the contractors identified above pursuant to the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 
U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-1 et 
seq. In addition, the Harrises alleged common law breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, breach of 
fiduciary duty, tortious interference, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation claims. 
 
In response to the Harrises' suit, Green Tree and the 
other defendants moved to compel arbitration and stay all 
proceedings in this action pending completion of 
arbitration. This motion was based on an arbitration clause 
that is contained in the secondary mortgage contracts 
signed by the Harrises. The clause, which appears in small 
print on the back and near the bottom of the one page form 
contract, provides as follows: 
 
       ARBITRATION - All disputes, claims, or controversies 
       arising from or relating to this contract or the 
       relationships which result from this contract, or the 
       validity of this arbitration clause or the entire contract, 
       shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one 
       arbitrator selected by us with consent of you. This 
       arbitration contract is made pursuant to a transaction 
       in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the 
       Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. section 1. Judgment 
       upon the award rendered may be entered in any court 
       having jurisdiction. The parties agree and understand 
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       that they choose arbitration instead of litigation to 
       resolve disputes. The parties understand that they 
       have a right or opportunity to litigate disputes through 
       a court, but that they prefer to resolve their disputes 
       through arbitration, except as provided herein. THE 
       PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE 
       ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER 
       PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE 
       OR PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY US (AS 
       PROVIDED HEREIN). The parties agree and 
       understand that all disputes arising under the case 
       law, statutory law, and all other laws including, but 
       not limited to, all contract, tort, and property disputes, 
       will be subject to binding arbitration in accord with 
       this contract. The parties agree and understand that 
       the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the law 
       and the contract. These powers shall include all legal 
       and equitable remedies, including, but not limited to, 
       money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive 
       relief. Notwithstanding anything hereunto the contrary, 
       we retain an option to use judicial or non-judicial relief 
       to enforce a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security 
       agreement relating to the real property secured in a 
       transaction underlying this arbitration agreement, or to 
       enforce the monetary obligation secured by the real 
       property, or to foreclose on the real property. Such 
       judicial relief would take the form of a lawsuit. The 
       institution and maintenance of an action for judicial 
       relief in a court to foreclose upon any collateral, to 
       obtain a monetary judgment or to enforce the mortgage 
       or deed of trust, shall not constitute a waiver of the 
       right of any party to compel arbitration regarding any 
       other dispute or remedy subject to arbitration in the 
       contract, including the filing of a counterclaim in a suit 
       brought by us pursuant to this provision. 
 
App. at 72-73. 
 
On May 30, 1997, the Harrises filed a motion opposing 
arbitration. The Harrises argued that the arbitration clause 
was invalid and unenforceable because the clause lacked 
the requisite mutuality and was unconscionable. Moreover, 
the Harrises argued that the arbitration clause could not be 
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enforced because they had been fraudulently induced to 
enter into the secondary mortgage contracts. 
 
After argument on defendants' motion to compel 
arbitration, the District Court issued a Memorandum and 
Order denying the motion.4 Because the clause "purports to 
bind only one of the contracting parties, the plaintiff 
borrower" and "leaves [Green Tree] free to litigate their 
claims if they wish to do so," the Court found it a "one- 
sided arrangement" that was "unconscionable." Harris v. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp., No. 97-1128, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 17, 1997). Thus, the apparent basis for the denial of 
Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration was the Court's 
determination that the arbitration clause lacked the 
requisite mutuality and, therefore, was unconscionable.5 
 
II. Discussion 
 
The parties do not dispute that the home improvement 
contracts involved in this dispute involve "commerce," as 
defined in 9 U.S.C. S 1. Thus, the arbitration clause at 
issue here falls within the scope of the FAA. See Becker 
Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 
F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 
Originally passed in 1925, the FAA was enacted to 
"revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements" by "plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the 
same footing as other contracts." Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1113 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987)). The FAA makes 
agreements to arbitrate enforceable to the same extent as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The district judge also denied the Harrises motion for an order 
precluding defendants from contacting any of the putative class 
members with settlement offers. Harris, No. 97-1128, slip op. at 3. Our 
disposition of the arbitration issue makes this aspect of the order moot 
on appeal. 
 
5. There is disagreement between the parties regarding the basis for the 
Court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The Harrises argue 
that the decision was based on unconscionability, while Green Tree 
contends that it was based upon a lack of mutuality. We address both 
potential bases for the District Court's ruling on appeal. 
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other contracts. Seus v. Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 178 
(3d Cir. 1998). Thus, federal law presumptively favors the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. In re Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 133 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
Federal law determines whether an issue governed by the 
FAA is referable to arbitration. See Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401-03 (1967); see 
also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
943 (1995)("[A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract 
between the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes-- 
but only those disputes--that the parties have agreed to 
submit to arbitration."). Pursuant to 9 U.S.C.SS 3-4,6 a 
federal court is authorized to compel arbitration if a party 
to an arbitration agreement institutes an action that 
involves an arbitrable issue and one party to the agreement 
has failed to enter arbitration. See Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984). 
 
Questions concerning the interpretation and construction 
of arbitration agreements are determined by reference to 
federal substantive law. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Section three of the FAA provides, in pertinent part, 
 
       If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the 
       United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an 
       agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court... upon being 
       satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is 
       referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on 
       application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action 
until 
       such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the 
       agreement.... 
 
9 U.S.C. S 3. 
 
Section four of the FAA provides, in pertinent part, 
 
       A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of 
       another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may 
       petition any United States district court which, save for the 
       agreement, would have jurisdiction ..., for an order directing that 
       such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such 
       agreement. 
 
9 U.S.C. S 4. 
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Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n. 32 (1983)("[The 
FAA] creates a body of federal substantive law establishing 
and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate. 
..."); Becker, 585 F.2d at 43. In interpreting such 
agreements, federal courts may apply state law, pursuant 
to section two of the FAA.7 Thus, generally applicable 
contract defenses may be applied to invalidate arbitration 
agreements without contravening the FAA. Doctor's 
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see 
also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987). 
 
If, however, a court deems a controverted arbitration 
clause a valid and enforceable agreement, it must refer 
questions regarding the enforceability of the terms of the 
underlying contract to an arbitrator, pursuant to section 
four of the FAA. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 395 ("Under 
[section four of the FAA] with respect to a matter within the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts save for the existence of an 
arbitration clause, the federal court is instructed to order 
arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that`the making 
of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply 
(with the arbitration agreement) is not in issue' "); Great 
Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 228 (3d 
Cir. 1997)("Once such [a valid arbitration] agreement is 
found, the merits of the controversy are left for disposition 
to the arbitrator."); see also 13B C. W RIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. 
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, S 3569 (2d ed. 
1984)("[E]ven in a diversity suit or an action in state court 
if a ... transaction ... in interstate ... commerce is involved, 
the substantive rules contained in the [FAA], ... are to be 
applied regardless of state law."). 
 
Accordingly, we decline to address arguments made by 
the Harrises that go to the validity of the home 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Section two of the FAA provides, in pertinent part, 
 
       A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction 
       involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter 
       arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform 
       the whole or any part thereof, ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
       enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for 
       the revocation of any contract. 
 
9 U.S.C. S 2. 
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improvement contracts. We leave those issues for the 
arbitrator. Here, we will address only those arguments 
directed to the validity and enforceability of the arbitration 
clause. 
 
1. Mutuality  
 
The doctrine of mutuality requires a contract to be based 
on an exchange of reciprocal promises. See 1A ARTHUR L. 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 152, at 3 (1963). Modern 
contract law largely has dispensed with the requirement of 
reciprocal promises, however, provided that a contract is 
supported by sufficient consideration. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 79 (1981). Nevertheless, the District 
Court apparently concluded that the arbitration clause at 
issue here is unenforceable due to lack of mutuality 
because it gives Green Tree the right to litigate arbitrable 
issues in court, while the Harrises may only invoke 
arbitration. 
 
Our decision in Becker, 585 F.2d at 39, provides 
guidance on the question of whether the arbitration clause 
should have been deemed unenforceable for lack of 
mutuality. Becker involved a contract that contained an 
arbitration clause that gave a West German company the 
option to arbitrate an issue in an American or German 
court or to litigate in an American court, while another 
party to the agreement, an American company, could only 
invoke arbitration in an American court. Id. at 42-47. The 
American company argued that this arbitration clause was 
unenforceable because of a lack of mutuality of obligations 
(i.e. the German company's choice of forum). Id . at 47 n. 15.8 
We declined to adopt a requirement of equivalency of 
obligation, however. Id. In so doing, we stated, "We know of 
no such doctrine of complete mutuality as a matter of 
federal law, and, because Becker U.S.A.'s argument has no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The central issue in Becker concerned whether the agreement 
containing the arbitration clause in fact was governed by the clause; the 
Court found that it was. 585 F.2d at 44-46. We then considered the 
American company's alternative argument that even if the agreement fell 
within the scope of the arbitration clause, the clause was unenforceable 
due to lack of mutuality. Id. at 47 n. 15. 
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support in logic, reason or precedent, we decline the 
invitation to adopt such a principle." Id.  
 
Our finding in Becker that mutuality is not a requirement 
of a valid arbitration clause is consistent with that of most 
other federal courts that have considered this issue. See 
e.g. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 451-53 
(2d Cir. 1995) (holding that mutuality of obligation or 
remedy not required to enforce arbitration agreement if 
underlying contract is supported by consideration); Wilson 
Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Minnotte Contracting Corp., 878 
F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1989) (rejecting claim that 
arbitration clause is an independent contract that requires 
separate consideration to be enforceable); Dorsey v. H.C.P. 
Sales, Inc., 1999 WL 257687 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 
1999)(holding that arbitration clause is not unenforceable 
for lack of identical obligations); Randolph v. Green Tree 
Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410, 1421-22 (M.D. Ala. 1997) 
(rejecting claim that arbitration clause that required one 
party to arbitrate all claims, while giving the second party 
the option not to arbitrate anything was invalid); Pate v. 
Melvin Williams Mfg. Homes, Inc., 198 B.R. 841, 844 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) (rejecting argument that arbitration 
agreement lacked mutuality because defendant company 
could sue over certain issues, while consumer had to 
arbitrate all claims). This substantive federal law stands for 
the proposition that parties to an arbitration agreement 
need not equally bind each other with respect to an 
arbitration agreement if they have provided each other with 
consideration beyond the promise to arbitrate. 
 
Many state courts have considered this issue, as well, 
including in actions involving Green Tree. Like this Court in 
Becker and other federal courts, these state courts have 
concluded that an arbitration clause need not be supported 
by equivalent obligations. See, e.g., Smith v. Sanderson 
Group, Inc., 1999 WL 357412 at *8 (Ala. June 4, 
1999)(rejecting claim that arbitration clause is 
unenforceable due to lack of mutuality of remedy); Parker v. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 1999 WL 130281 at * 2-4 (Ala. March 
12, 1999) (rejecting claim that arbitration clause is 
unenforceable due to lack of mutuality of remedy and 
unconscionability); Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 498 
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S.E.2d 898, 904 (S.C. App. 1998) (holding that mutuality of 
obligation existed because consideration flowed to each 
contracting party); Ishmael v. Dutch Housing Inc., No. 
96AP100084, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3974 *4-6 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1997) (rejecting consumer's argument that defendant's 
exclusion from requirement to arbitrate certain issues made 
arbitration clause unenforceable). 
 
While Pennsylvania courts appear not to have considered 
whether mutuality is required in arbitration agreements, 
Pennsylvania law, consistent with the most recent 
restatement of contracts, does not otherwise require both 
parties to an agreement to have equivalent obligations to 
satisfy the standard of mutuality of obligation. See Greene 
v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Pa. Super. 
1987); Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 316 (Pa. 
Super. 1986). As long as the requirement of consideration 
is met, mutuality of obligation is present, even if one party 
is more obligated than the other. Greene, 526 A.2d at 1195 
("Modern contract law recognizes that, `if the requirement of 
consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of 
... equivalence in the values exchanged....' "). Each promise 
need not be supported by separate consideration. Id. at 
1195. 
 
Thus, the District Court's understanding of the 
significance of the "one-sided" nature of the arbitration 
clause contained in the contracts signed by the Harrises 
was in error. See Harris, No. 97-1128, slip op. at 2. It is of 
no legal consequence that the arbitration clause gives 
Green Tree the option to litigate arbitrable issues in court, 
while requiring the Harrises to invoke arbitration. 
 
2. Unconscionability 
 
Unconscionability is a "defensive contractual remedy 
which serves to relieve a party from an unfair contract or 
from an unfair portion of a contract." Germantown Mfg. Co. 
v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145 (Pa. Super. 1985) (quoting 
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 707 (1973)). The 
party challenging a contract provision as unconscionable 
generally bears the burden of proving unconscionability. 
Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088, 1094 (Pa. Super. 
1984); see also Argo Welded Products, Inc. v. J.T. Ryerson 
Steel & Sons, 528 F. Supp. 583, 592-93 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
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In evaluating claims of unconscionability, courts 
generally recognize two categories, procedural, or"unfair 
surprise," unconscionability and substantive 
unconscionability. See Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 
596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. 1991); Bishop, 480 A.2d at 
1095; Germantown, 491 A.2d at 145-46. Procedural 
unconscionability pertains to the process by which an 
agreement is reached and the form of an agreement, 
including the use therein of fine print and convoluted or 
unclear language. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS S 4.28 
(2d ed. 1990). This type of unconscionability involves, for 
example, "material, risk-shifting" contractual terms which 
"are not typically expected by the party who is being asked 
to `assent' to them" and "often appear[ ] in the boilerplate of 
a printed form." Germantown, 491 A.2d at 145-46. 
Substantive unconscionability refers to contractual terms 
that are unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and 
to which the disfavored party does not assent. See id., at 
145-147; Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 1061, 1068 
(Pa. Super. 1992). Thus, "[u]nconscionability requires a 
two-fold determination: that the contractual terms are 
unreasonably favorable to the drafter and that there is no 
meaningful choice on the part of the other party regarding 
acceptance of the provisions." Bensalem Township v. 
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1312 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (quoting Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
Brady, 973 F.2d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 
       a. Procedural Unconscionability 
 
In finding the arbitration clause at issue here 
unenforceable, the District Court wrote, "The relevant 
documents do contain (in very small print, on the reverse 
side) an arbitration clause...." Harris, No. 97-1128, slip op. 
at 1-2. This parenthetical language suggests the court's 
skepticism about the form of the arbitration clause. 
Although it is not clear that this skepticism was the basis 
for the court's denial of Green Tree's motion to compel 
arbitration, the Harrises argue on appeal that we should 
find the arbitration clause unenforceable because of its 
form. Specifically, the Harrises argue that the clause is 
procedurally unconscionable because it appears infine 
 
                                14 
  
print on the back of the relevant standard form contracts 
and because it did not appear at all in work orders that 
contractors required them to sign before beginning repairs 
or improvements to their homes. 
 
Pennsylvania law provides support for certain claims of 
procedural unconscionability that are based on 
inconspicuous or unclear contractual language, in 
particular, if the contracting parties have unequal 
bargaining power. See Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors 
Equip. Co., 595 A.2d 1190, 1196-97 (Pa. Super. 1991) 
(finding disclaimer of warranties clause that appeared in 
fine print and on reverse side of sales agreement 
unconscionable, where disadvantaged party was not an 
experienced buyer); Germantown, 491 A.2d at 145-47 
(finding unenforceable confession of judgment clause that 
appeared in fine print in boilerplate language of standard 
form contract, where party clearly did not understand its 
significance). These cases do not, however, concern 
arbitration clauses and are, therefore, inapposite to this 
case. Moreover, other Pennsylvania law conflicts with the 
holdings of these cases. See e.g. Standard Venetian Blind 
Co., v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 
1983) (stating that failure to read or lack of knowledge of 
clearly drafted contractual provision does not warrant 
avoidance or nullification of its provisions). 
 
In any event, the FAA and federal law construing the Act 
govern the result in this case, and this authority does not 
support the Harrises' claim of procedural unconscionability. 
For instance, in Troshak v. Terminix Int'l Co., 1998 WL 
401693 (E.D. Pa. 1998), the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania has held that language that is clear 
and ambiguous must be recognized and enforced. Id. at * 2 
(citing Spigelmire v. School Dist. of Braddock, 43 A.2d 229 
(Pa. 1945)). Thus, the Troshak court rejected a claim that 
an arbitration clause was unconscionable merely because it 
was on the reverse side of a contract; since the language 
directing the contracting party to the reverse side of the 
contract was clear and in plain view, the court found assent 
to the agreement. Id. at *3 (citing Standard, 469 A.2d at 
566). Similarly, in McCullough v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 
Inc., 1988 WL 23008, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1988), the 
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District Court for Western District of Pennsylvania rejected 
an argument that an arbitration clause was 
unconscionable, where it was not printed more prominently 
than other parts of the contract. Accord Cantella & Co., Inc. 
v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996) (holding that 
clause is not "hidden" if it appears on the back of a single- 
page document, where the "ARBITRATION" notice is in 
bold, and given a presumption that a party who signs a 
contract knows its contents). 
 
Moreover, the Harrises' claim is not supported by Doctor's 
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 1652 (1996), the 
recent Supreme Court case construing the relationship 
between section two of the FAA and a Montana statute 
regulating the form of arbitration agreements. The statute 
at issue in Doctor's Associates required"[n]otice that a 
contract is subject to arbitration" to be "typed in underlined 
capital letters on the first page of the contract." Id. at 684. 
However, the arbitration clause at issue in the case was set 
out in ordinary type on page nine of a standard form 
agreement. Id. Thus, the clause did not conform to the 
requirements of the Montana statute; therefore, the 
Montana Supreme Court found the arbitration agreement 
unenforceable. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that section two of the FAA preempted the Montana 
statute's notice requirements. Id. at 688. In so doing, the 
Supreme Court explained that courts may not invalidate 
arbitration agreements under state laws that single out the 
provisions of arbitration agreements for suspect status; 
such provisions must be placed "upon the same footing as 
other contracts." Id. at 687 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto- 
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Court further noted in Doctor's Associates that the respondent 
had urged at oral argument that the arbitration clause might be 
invalidated as an unexpected provision in a contract of adhesion. The 
Court reiterated that the Montana Supreme Court had not based its 
decision on such a theory and the Court was not reviewing it. The Court 
cautioned, however, that "a court may not `rely on the uniqueness of an 
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that 
enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to 
effect what ... the state legislature cannot'." 517 U.S. at 687-88, n.3 
(quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493, n.9 (1987). 
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Thus, we find that the arbitration clause involved in this 
action was not procedurally unconscionable. 
 
       b. Substantive Unconscionability 
 
According to the Harrises, the arbitration clause is 
substantively unconscionable because it allows Green Tree 
the option of litigating disputes, while it provides no such 
choice to them. They also argue that the clause is 
unconscionable because it allegedly provides that Green 
Tree does not have to obtain the Harrises' consent in 
selecting the arbitrator. 
 
This argument overlaps substantially with the issue of 
mutuality, addressed above. As stated above, the mere fact 
that Green Tree retains the option to litigate some issues in 
court, while the Harrises must arbitrate all claims does not 
make the arbitration agreement unenforceable. We have 
held repeatedly that inequality in bargaining power, alone, 
is not a valid basis upon which to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement. See Great Western, 110 F.3d at 229 (citing 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 
(1991)); Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1118. 
 
The Harrises then claim that the arbitration clause is 
unenforceable because Green Tree does not need to obtain 
the Harrises' consent in selecting the arbitrator. We note, 
however, that the language of the arbitration clause does 
not comport with the Harrises' interpretation of their rights 
regarding the choice of arbitrator. Rather, the clause 
provides that the arbitrator will be "selected by us [Green 
Tree] with the consent of you [the Harrises]." In the event 
that Green Tree and the Harrises do not agree on Green 
Tree's choice of arbitrator, section five of the FAA provides 
that either party may petition the court to appoint an 
arbitrator.10 This provision of the Act provides a safety valve 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Section five of the FAA provides, in pertinent part, 
 
       If in the [arbitration] agreement provision be made for a method of 
       naming or appointing an arbitrator ... such method shall be 
       followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be 
       provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such 
       method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the 
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for a party to an arbitration agreement who does not 
consent to the other party's choice of arbitrator. 
 
Thus, we do not find that the terms of the arbitration 
clause are so unreasonably favorable to Green Tree as to 
make the clause substantively unconscionable. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
this case to the District Court with directions to enter an 
order granting defendants' motion to stay and to compel 
arbitration. 
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naming of an arbitrator ... then upon the application of either party 
to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an 
arbitrator ... who shall act under the said agreement with the same 
force and effect as if he ... had been specifically named therein; and 
unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be 
by a single arbitrator. 
 
9 U.S.C. S 5. 
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